David Walker’s famous 1829 Appeal to the Colored Citizens of the World
expresses a puzzle at the very outset. What are we to make of the use of
“Citizens” in the title given the denial of political rights to African Americans?
This essay argues that the pamphlet relies on the cultural and linguistic
norms associated with the term appeal in order to call into existence the
political standing of black folks. Walker’s use of citizen does not need to
rely on a recognitive legal relationship precisely because it is the practice
of judging that illuminates one’s political, indeed, citizenly standing. Properly
understood, the Appeal aspires to transform blacks and whites, and when
it informs the prophetic dimension of the text, it tilts the entire pamphlet
in a democratic direction. This is the political power of the pamphlet; it
exemplifies the call-and-response logic of democratic self-governance.
http://ptx.sagepub.com/content/early/2014/03/12/0090591714523623.full.pdf+html

While contemporary scholars generally view the Senate’s nominee approval role as impacting bureaucratic capacities and the president’s ability to realize campaign pledges, empiricists and theorists focus on different elements of bargaining. Since empiricists typically study confirmation delays, and theorists normally analyze equilibrium nomination preferences, theory and data rarely inform one another.

We remedy this by specifying an executive appointment model jointly incorporating delays and appointee ideologies. Besides predicting appointees’ equilibrium ideologies, and contrary to past claims about the relationship between ideology and duration, this theory details how ideological differences between the president and his opposition do not straightforwardly induce longer delays; rather, effects are conditioned by factors such as the office’s policy importance and divided government. Additionally, different pathways for parties to impact appointee ideology and duration are flexibly incorporated. Empirically, theoretical hypotheses receive support and evidence of parties impacting Senate trade-offs between delay and policy outcomes and successfully pressuring key members over high-stakes appointments are uncovered. 

http://jtp.sagepub.com/content/26/3/496

Fang-Yi ChiouAcademia Sinica, Taiwan
Lawrence S Rothenberg
University of Rochester, USA